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Comment
Run, Kick, and (Im)passe: Expanding Employers'
Ability to Unilaterally Impose Conditions of
Employment After Impasse in Brown v. Pro Football
Steven D. Buchholz*
In 1987, the collective bargaining agreement between the
National Football League (NFL)' and the NFL Players' Asso-
ciation2 expired.3 During negotiation of a new collective bar-
gaining agreement, the NFL presented a "developmental
squad" plan to the union.4 The plan proposed a developmental
squad player salary of $1,000 per week, which the union
promptly rejected, insisting that the developmental squad
players remain free to negotiate salaries individually, as do
regular professional players.5 Nonetheless, when negotiations
* J.D. Candidate 1998, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1994,
South Dakota State University. The author would like to thank Dean E.
Thomas Sullivan for suggesting that Brown was ripe for commentary and
John Bursch for his grueling brainstorming sessions. The author also wishes
to dedicate this Comment to McMike, who never let him forget that life is
more than a law review article.
1. The NFL is a group of professional football club owners. Brown v. Pro
Football, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2116, 2119 (1996).
2. The union is also known as the NFLPA and is a labor organization
representing professional football players. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 782 F.
Supp. 125, 127 (D.D.C. 1991), rev'd, 50 F.3d 1051 (D.C.Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S.
Ct. 2116 (1996).
3. Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2119.
4. Id. "Resolution G-2" provided that each club could have a "developmental
squad" of up to six first-year players that had failed to secure positions on the
regular roster. Id. Under the plan, the developmental players would function
like minor league players, scrimmaging with regular players and sometimes
appearing as substitutes in regular games. Id. All developmental players
would receive identical weekly salaries. Id.
5. Id. The developmental squad provision had never been the subject of
a collective bargaining agreement between the owners and the players.
Brown, 782 F. Supp. at 138. In fact, the district court found that the devel-
opmental squads added a "novel category of players to each NFL club." Id.
Additionally, there was substantial disagreement at trial about whether the
resolution had been the subject of "arm's-length" negotiation. Brown, 116 S.
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on this issue reached impasse, the NFL began paying practice
squad players a fixed $1,000 salary without an agreement with
the players' union.6 The developmental squad players re-
sponded with an antitrust suit against the NFL and its mem-
ber clubs. They claimed that the agreement violated the
Sherman Act 7 by fixing salaries and eliminating competition
for player services. The district court agreed with the players,
8
but the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed.9
In Brown v. Pro Football Inc.," the United States Supreme
Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that "under the
circumstances" the owners' conduct was exempt from the anti-
trust laws."
On its face, Brown appeared to apply a test similar to the
one lower courts follow 2 and declared that antitrust laws do
not apply to labor-management disputes except in extreme
situations. 3 The decision pleased professional sports owners
as well as a multitude of joint employer groups across the
country, who interpreted the decision as removing multiem-
Ct. at 2130 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens specifically noted, "The
so-called 'bargaining' that followed amounted to nothing more than the em-
ployers' notice to the union that they had decided to implement a decision to
replace individual salary negotiations with a uniform wage level for a specific
group of players." Id.
6. Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2119. After implementing Resolution G-2, the
league informed the club owners that paying more or less than $1,000 per
week would result in league disciplinary action. Id.
7. See infra notes 15-21 and accompanying text (discussing the general
interpretation of the Sherman Act).
8. The court refused to apply labor's "nonstatutory" antitrust exemption
to the resolution, and a jury awarded the players more than $30 million in
damages. Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2119. For a discussion of the development and
application of the nonstatutory labor exemption, see infra notes 36-42 and ac-
companying text.
9. The court of appeals concluded that the NFL action fell within the
scope of the antitrust exemption. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041,
1048 (D.C. Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996). The court followed a
three-pronged test similar to the one lower courts traditionally use to evalu-
ate antitrust exemptions: (1) the owners imposed the fixed salary as part of
the "collective bargaining process"; (2) the resolution did not violate the labor
laws; and (3) the action affected a labor market rather than a product market.
Id.
10. Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2127.
11. Id. The Court applied the exemption, but claimed not to interpret it
as broadly as the D.C. Circuit. Id. at 2119.
12. See id. at 2127 (noting that the agreement arose from the collective
bargaining process, did not violate the labor laws, and concerned a mandatory
subject of bargaining).
13. Id.
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ployer bargaining agreements from antitrust scrutiny. 4 Such
an interpretation is troubling, however, because it upsets the
delicate balance of bargaining power under the federal labor
laws in favor of employers, frustrates the goals of federal anti-
trust laws, and is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.
This Comment contends that Brown drastically changed
federal labor law. Part I discusses federal antitrust and labor
laws and the evolution of the judicially-created "nonstatutory
labor exemption." It also introduces the lower court decisions
that attempted to establish the scope of this exemption. Part II
analyzes the reasoning of the Brown decision. Part III posits
that Brown favors employers by recognizing that labor law
policy no longer promotes a pro-employee collective bargaining
platform and by requiring unions to exhaust labor law reme-
dies before they attack employer actions under the more potent
antitrust laws. Finally, Part III argues that, despite the inter-
pretation favored by joint employer groups and professional
sports owners, the Brown Court actually applied a balancing
test that differs from the three-pronged test lower courts have
followed in applying nonstatutory antitrust exemptions. The
traditional "balancing test" interpretation is critical because it
preserves the application of antitrust law to joint employer acts
and prevents employers from abusing the collective bargaining
process by imposing terms of employment at will. This reading
is also necessary to preserve federal antitrust policies and to
maintain consistency with Supreme Court precedent.
14 See Patrick Graham, State and National Contractors Earn Blessing of
High Court in Football Anti-Trust Suit, MEMPI-s Bus. J., Aug. 5, 1996, at 18
(stating that Brown was a "victory for contractors nationwide" and that con-
tractor groups, which regularly negotiate employment contracts with subcon-
tractors, could now remove multiemployer groups from the reach of the anti-
trust laws); Allan H. Weitzman & Kathleen M. McKenna, The Supreme Court
Has Held That a Multiemployer Group May Impose Contract Terms Unilater-
ally After a Bargaining Impasse, NAT'L L.J., July 29, 1996, at B4 (interpreting
Brown as establishing that multiemployer bargaining groups, which negotiate
more than 40% of all collective bargaining agreements in the United States,
may impose contract terms after impasse "without risk of antitrust liability").
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE LABOR EXEMPTION TO THE
ANTITRUST LAWS
A. ANTITRUST LAW
The Sherman Act governs U.S. antitrust policy.15 The Act
prohibits "[elvery contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with Foreign nations." 6 Despite
this all-inclusive language, however, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the Act to prohibit only unreasonable restraints of
trade."
Congress designed the antitrust laws to protect consumers
by preventing monopolistic behavior and encouraging the effi-
cient use of resources through free competition for goods.1 8
Certain practices are per se violations of the antitrust laws,
such as price fixing and output restrictions among competitors
in an industry. 9 Courts analyze other practices under the
15. See generally E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HovENKAMP, AN-
TITRUST LAW, POLIcY, AND PROCEDURE 1-4 (3d ed. 1994) (explaining the broad
provisions of the Sherman Act that courts and scholars have interpreted as
targeting both monopolistic concentrations of industrial power and inefficient
uses of economic resources).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
17. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984) [hereinafter NCAA] (explaining that,
because all contracts are restraints of trade in the sense that they limit con-
tracting parties' freedom to negotiate and enter into other contracts, Congress
must have intended the Sherman Act to prohibit only unreasonable restraints
of trade); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911) (stating that
the "dread of enhancement of prices and of other wrongs" thought to follow
from contracts which restricted competition led to the prohibition of actions
that were "unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions").
18. See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING
ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS § 1.02 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing
the widely accepted policy reasons for the Sherman and Clayton Acts such as
Jeffersonian/Hamiltonian "allocative efficiency," consumer welfare and the
efficient use of resources). Congress attempted to deter anticompetitive con-
duct by allowing antitrust plaintiffs to sue for treble damages. Id. § 3.02.
This policy stands today despite criticism that it encourages frivolous lawsuits
and excessive litigation. Id.
19. See, e.g., Palmer v. BRG, Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49-50 (1990) (holding that
any attempt among competitors to divide and control markets or submarkets
is per se illegal); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221
(1940) (noting that any conspiracy to fix prices is a per se violation of the
Sherman Act, even if the plaintiff cannot show that the defendants had
enough market control to carry out the plan).
These types of restrictions are known as "horizontal" restraints because
1204 [Vol. 81:1201
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"rule of reason," which allows a more complete inquiry into an
agreement's economic consequences to balance the procom-
petitive effects of a restraint of trade against the injury it
causes to the freely competitive market. 0 The Supreme Court
has applied the "rule of reason" in industries where competi-
tors must use some restraints on competition to create a mar-
ketable product, such as organized league sports.21
they involve competitors at the same level in an industry, rather than at dif-
ferent stages of the production process. See generally SULLIVAN & HO-
VENKAMP, supra note 15, at 183-85 (defining and listing examples of horizon-
tal restraints).
20. RIcHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN EcONOMIC PERSPECTrvE 27
(1976). Under the "rule of reason," a restraint will violate the antitrust laws
only if its procompetitive efficiencies do not outweigh its negative impact on
competition. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 103-04. In one case, the Court required a
rule of reasQn analysis in a cooperative joint venture marketing a previously
unavailable product because of the procompetitive effect. Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23-25 (1979). In that case, the
Supreme Court held that blanket fees were not per se illegal because they
substantially lowered costs for both sellers and buyers and essentially created
a product that individual composers could not create alone. Id. at 21-24; see
also Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51-57 (1977)
(holding that a restraint in a limited aspect of a market is not per se illegal
because it may enhance competition in the wider market). But cf. Arizona v.
Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 355-56 (1982) (discussing Broad-
cast Music but holding that an agreement among competing doctors to estab-
lish and maintain fixed prices for medical services did not create procompeti-
tive efficiencies and was per se illegal).
Another factor that has reduced the number of successful antitrust claims
is the concept of "antitrust injury." The notion arose from section four of the
Clayton Act, which requires antitrust plaintiffs to suffer injury "by reason of'
the antitrust violation to succeed on an antitrust claim. SULLIVAN &
HARRISON, supra note 18, § 3.02[B]. In Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-
Mat, the Court defined antitrust injury as harm caused by a reduction in
competitive conditions in the relevant market directly because of the defen-
danfs anticompetitive acts. 429 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1977).
21. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101 (citing ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX 278-79 (1978)). Examples of restraints that competitors in the
sports context must impose include rules affecting the size of the playing field,
the number of players per team, and the extent of physical contact allowed.
Id.
The Supreme Coures watershed decision in NCAA guides lower courts'
application of the antitrust laws to organized league sports. In that case, two
member schools of the NCAA, the national association that regulates amateur
collegiate sports, brought an antitrust suit alleging that the association had
violated the Sherman Act by fixing prices for the rights to televise college
football games and by limiting the number of games that the networks could
televise. Id. at 91-94. Despite its ultimate finding that the NCAA was re-
stricting the number of televised games without any procompetitive justifica-
tions, the Court cited the myriad of horizontal restrictions that enhance com-
petition in the league sports context and applied the "rule of reason" to
determine the legality of the NCAA's plan. Id. at 103.
1997] 1205
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B. LABOR LAW
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)22 shapes federal
labor policy.2 3 Congress passed the Act in 193524 to protect "the
right of employees to organize" and bargain collectively. 5 The
Act established an administrative body, the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB), to safeguard the public from inter-
ruptions in commerce that follow from industrial unrest, to en-
courage peaceful settlement of labor-management disputes
over wages, hours, and other terms of employment, and, to re-
store equal bargaining power between employers and employ-
ees.
26
The NLRA prohibits an employer from interfering with the
rights of employees to organize in unions, to bargain collec-
tively, and to engage in concerted activities like strikes.27 If an
employer interferes, the NLRB will find it guilty of committing
an "unfair labor practice."2  Upon such a determination, the
22. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994). The original act was also known as the
Wagner Act in honor of its most adamant proponent, Senator Robert Wagner.
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT 26-27 (Patrick Hardin et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992)
[hereinafter DEVELOPING LABOR LAW].
23. See DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 22, at 27-30.
24. Congress has substantially amended the Act on two occasions by
passing, in 1947, the Taft-Hartley amendments and, in 1959, the Landrum-
Griffin amendments. Id. at 35-60. The Act has remained largely unchanged
since 1959. Id. at 61.
25. 29 U.S.C. § 151.
26. Id. Great Depression and economists' suggestion that unionization
would increase wages and economic productivity heightened interest in creat-
ing a federal labor statute. ARCHIBALD Cox ET AL., LABOR LAW 76-77 (12th
ed. 1996).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 157. These three rights are commonly referred to as em-
ployees' "Section 7 rights." COX ET AL., supra note 26, at 78. When Congress
passed the Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA in 1947, the goal of the la-
bor laws shifted from strict protection of employees to a "hands-off' policy en-
couraging vigorous collective bargaining. DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra
note 22, at 35-45; see also infra notes 123-127 (discussing reasons for the
shifting aims of labor law).
28. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (stating inter alia that it is an unfair labor
practice for an employer to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees" in
the exercise of their rights under section 157 of the NLRA, or to discriminate
in hiring or firing based on union activity, or to refuse to bargain collectively
with a union's elected bargaining representative). With the Taft-Hartley
amendments, Congress established that unions commit unfair labor practices
by restraining employees in the exercise of their § 157 rights, causing or at-
tempting to cause employers to discriminate in hiring or firing, refusing to
bargain collectively with an employer, and engaging in certain types of picket-
ing. Id. § 158(b).
[Vol. 81:12011206
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NLRB may issue a cease and desist order 9 or order the em-
ployer to reinstate wrongfully discharged employees, some-
times with back pay.30 Further, when the NLRB believes an
employer is refusing to negotiate with a union, the NLRB will
order the employer to bargain "in good faith."3 This duty ap-
plies to the "mandatory subjects" of bargaining such as wages,
hours, and other conditions of employment 2 and continues
29. Id. § 160(c). The NLRB occasionally seeks injunctions in federal dis-
trict court to enjoin challenged labor or management practices pending final
NLRB determination of whether the conduct is an unfair labor practice. Id. §
160().
30. Id. § 160(c). In Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, an employer refused to
hire highly qualified job applicants because of their union involvement, and
the Supreme Court held that the NLRB's power to reinstate workers could
encompass the power to force employers to hire qualified applicants with un-
ion ties. 313 U.S. 177, 188-89 (1941). Despite this indication that the NLRB
has an arsenal of effective weapons at its disposal to remedy labor law viola-
tions, in the 50 years since the Taft-Hartley amendments commentators have
concluded that remedies under the NLRA do not deter powerful unions and
employers who are determined to further their goals regardless of the law.
See generally FLORIAN BARTOSIC & ROGER C. HARTLEY, LABOR RELATIONS iN
THE PRWVATE SECTOR §§ 7.04, 8.07(j) (2d ed. 1986) (discussing remedies avail-
able to the NLRB in the context of employer refusals to bargain in good faith
and union misconduct in picketing, and noting that remedies are limited to
injunctions and recovery of "damages 'sustained'" rather than punitive dam-
ages) (citation omitted).
31. The NLRA provides that "good faith negotiation" consists of meeting
at "reasonable times" and discussing wages, hours, and other conditions of
employment. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). The duty to bargain in good faith does not
require either party to agree to a certain proposal or make any concessions.
Id. Commentators have noted, however, that "going through the motions of
negotiating" undermines collective bargaining just as much as "bluntly with-
holding recognition." Archibald Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71
HARv. L. REv. 1401, 1413 (1958).
In NLRB v. A-1 King Size Sandwiches, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit re-
viewed substantive bargaining proposals to determine whether an employer
entered into collective bargaining with genuine intentions to reach an agree-
ment. 732 F.2d 872, 874 (11th Cir. 1984). The record showed that the em-
ployer insisted on exclusive control over discharge, management rights, and
nearly all other conditions of employment. Id. at 877. Further, the employer
responded to union suggestions for compromise with proposals more extreme
than before. Id. The court held that the employer had indeed failed to bar-
gain in good faith. Id.; see also NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d
676, 684 (9th Cir. 1943) (quoting NLRB v. Boss Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 187, 189
(7th Cir. 1941)) (stating that the NLRA requires parties involved in collective
bargaining to negotiate "with an open and fair mind" and to "sincerely en-
deavor to overcome obstacles or difficulties" in reaching a collective bargain-
ing agreement).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). The good faith bargaining duty only extends to manda-
tory subjects because of their extreme importance to the employer/employee rela-
tionship. Cox ET AL., supra note 26, at 408-09. The Supreme Court first inter-
12071997]
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even after collective bargaining negotiations break down.33
Thus, even if the parties reach impasse, the duty to bargain in
good faith still requires "reasonable" comprehension of the
employer's unilateral changes 34 in employment terms within
pre-impasse proposals. 3
5
preted the term "mandatory subjects" in NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356
U.S. 342, 348-50 (1958). In that case, an employer refused to conclude a col-
lective bargaining agreement unless the certified union agreed to a pre-strike
voting provision and recognition of an additional union. Id. at 343. The
NLRB and the Supreme Court found that the provisions did not involve
wages, hours, or other terms of employment within the meaning of § 8(d) and
that the employer violated the labor laws by insisting on the non-mandatory
subjects. Id. at 344. The Court reasoned that the parties could permissibly
include proposals on pre-strike voting and recognition of an additional union,
but that the employer could not insist on the provisions because they fell out-
side the proper scope of "wages, hours, and other conditions of employment."
Id. at 349-50.
33. The point at which collective bargaining has broken down, otherwise
known as the point of impasse, depends on many factors. In Charles D. Bo-
nanno Linen Service v. NLRB, the Court defined impasse as a "temporary
deadlock or hiatus in negotiations which in almost all cases is eventually bro-
ken, through either a change of mind or the application of economic force."
454 U.S. 404, 412 (1982) (citation omitted). The Court also explained that im-
passe is a recurring feature in collective bargaining, and that parties may
bring about impasse intentionally as a means of furthering the collective bar-
gaining process. Id.
34. Implementing contract terms without a union-employer agreement is
referred to as a "unilateral imposition" of contract terms. See DEVELOPING
LABOR LAW, supra note 22, at 596-601 (discussing unilateral impositions of
contract terms and when they support an inference of an employer's refusal to
bargain in good faith); see also Archibald Cox & John T. Dunlop, Regulation of
Collective Bargaining by the National Labor Relations Board, 63 HARV. L.
REV. 389, 391 (1950) (discussing the extent to which the NLRB has made tra-
ditionally "entrepreneurial" decisions subject to the joint control of employers
and employees in the collective bargaining context).
For an example of conduct that courts have held properly within exclusive
employer control, see American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300,
308-18 (1965). In that case, an employer had engaged in collective bargaining
with a group of unions on five occasions, but all agreements were preceded by
strikes. Id. at 302. When the current negotiations reached impasse, the em-
ployer unilaterally laid off all employees in a "lock out" until resolution of the
dispute so that the employees would not strategically strike to cause the em-
ployer irreparable financial injury. Id. at 304. The Supreme Court, in revers-
ing the NLRB, held that employers do not violate the NLRA when they shut
down their enterprise temporarily, as long as the action is not directed to in-
juring the labor organization or evading the duty to bargain in good faith. Id.
at 307-08, 318. The Court also emphasized that the employer in American
Ship Building was not motivated by anti-union animus and had bargained to
impasse in good faith. Id. at 305-06. Similarly, in First National Maintenance
Corp. v. NLRB, an employer unilaterally terminated an agreement to provide
maintenance services less than two weeks after a union was certified and had
informed the employer of its desire to begin collective bargaining, which re-
[Vol. 81:12011208
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C. CREATION OF LABOR'S STATUTORY AND NONSTATUTORY
ANTITRUST EXEMPTIONS
Even before Congress enacted the NLRA, it recognized
that antitrust laws would apply to labor unions' concerted ac-
tivities. 6 It also recognized, however, that this would stifle the
sulted in the employer's termination of all union members. 452 U.S. 666, 669-
70 (1981). The NLRB found that the action constituted a refusal to negotiate,
in violation of § 8(a)(5), and ordered the employer to reinstate the terminated
employees to substantially equivalent positions, with backpay for the lost
wages. Id. at 671-72. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the decision
to terminate the maintenance contract naturally had a significant impact on
employees through the elimination of jobs, but dealt solely with the economic
profitability of the maintenance contract. Id. at 688. The Court found this
decision to be completely separate from the employment relationship, "akin to
the decision whether to be in business at all." Id. at 677. Therefore, the
Court held that the employer's interest in free management outweighed the
employees' interest in collective bargaining over the decision to close the op-
eration. Id. at 686.
The Supreme Court discussed the NLRB standard for good faith negotia-
tion where employers unilaterally impose employment terms in NLRB v.
Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 742-43 (1962). In that case, an employer unilaterally
granted merit pay increases and instituted a change in sick-leave policy, is-
sues upon which the union and the employer had negotiated but had not
reached agreement. Id. at 740-41. The policies were implemented between
October 1956 and April 1957, while negotiations continued from August 1956
to May 1957. Id. The Court held that the employer violated the NLRA despite
the employer's subjective desire to reach an agreement, noting that "an em-
ployer's unilateral change in conditions of employment under negotiation.., is a
circumvention of the duty to negotiate which frustrates the objectives of § 8(a)(5)
much as does a flat refusal [to negotiate]." Id. at 743; see also Bonanno Linen,
454 U.S. at 416 (stating that impasse in collective bargaining does not in any
way release parties from the duty to bargain in good faith); Hinson v. NLRB,
428 F.2d 133, 137 (8th Cir. 1970) (holding that, even after expiration of a col-
lective bargaining agreement, employers have an obligation to bargain in good
faith before making unilateral changes "in those terms and conditions of em-
ployment comprising mandatory bargaining subjects within the meaning of §
8(d) of the Act") (citation omitted).
35. Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Advanced Lightweight Con-
crete Co., 484 U.S. 539, 543-44 n.5 (1988) (quoting Taft Broadcasting Co., 163
N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967)). Similarly, in American Federation of Television &
Radio Artists v. NLRB, the employer unilaterally imposed wage increases and
fringe benefits after negotiating 27 times with the union and reaching im-
passe. 395 F.2d 622, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The NLRB held that, despite con-
taining one provision never before submitted to the union, the employer pro-
posal was reasonably comprehended within the "ambit" of pre-impasse
proposals. Id. at 629-30.
36. See, e.g., Connell Construction Co., Inc. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters
Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 621-22 (1975) (explaining the union's need
to have the ability to act concertedly and unilaterally, but noting that anti-
trust policy does not exempt labor unions); United States v. Hutcheson, 312
U.S. 219, 230-31 (1941) (describing the ways in which employers used the an-
titrust laws to prevent the formation of unions); see also Cox ET AL. supra
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labor movement's goals." Therefore, Congress enacted an an-
titrust exemption" for certain labor-related activities in the
Clayton Act of 19143" and the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932.40
Both statutes prohibit employers from invoking the antitrust
laws to prevent labor organization and concerted activity.
Ironically, the statutory antitrust exemption in the Clay-
ton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts protected union activity but not
labor-management agreements reached through successful
collective bargaining.41  Consequently, the Supreme Court de-
note 26, at 28 (stating that, although Congress intended the Sherman Act to
eliminate monopolistic cooperation among manufacturers, soon after its pas-
sage it was more commonly applied to labor unions than businesses).
37. See FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION
24-27 (1930) (describing the obstacle to unionization that labor injunctions
caused and arguing that the ends of unionization, namely improved working
conditions, justified a certain degree of concerted activity).
38. See, e.g., Connell Construction Co., 421 U.S. at 622 (noting that there
is a "strong labor policy favoring the association of employees to eliminate
competition over wages and working conditions"); Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 231
(explaining that the statutory exemptions "explicitly formulated the 'public
policy of the United States' in regard to the industrial conflict, and by its light
established that the allowable area of union activity was not to be restricted")
(footnote omitted).
39. 15 U.S.C. §§ 17, 20 (1994). The Clayton Act provides that "[niothing
contained in the anti-trust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and
operation of labor ... organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual
help." Id. § 17. Furthermore, the Act prevents the courts from granting in-
junctions to prevent the formation of labor groups unless absolutely necessary
to prevent injury to the property or property rights of an employer. 29 U.S.C.§ 52 (1994).
40. 29 U.S.C. 99 101-15. Courts interpreted the Clayton Act's labor ex-
emption narrowly, causing Congress to enact a clearer exemption in the Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act. See, e.g., Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 231 (stating that the Act
was needed to remove the restrictions on union activities that judicial inter-
pretation of § 20 of the Clayton Act had preserved, by limiting the circum-
stances in which courts could grant injunctions to prevent union organiza-
tion); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 469-72 (1921)
(holding that the Clayton Act's exemption only extended to acts between the
two disputing parties, but that labor organizations were subject to antitrust
liability and court injunctions as soon as they involved a third party in the
dispute through activities such as pickets or boycotts). The Norris-LaGuardia
Act provides:
[Ilt is necessary that [workers] have full freedom of association, self-
organization, and designation of representatives of [their] own
choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of [their] employ-
ment, and that [they] shall be free from the interference, restraint, or
coercion of employers of labor ... in the designation of such repre-
sentatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities ....
29 U.S.C. § 102.
41. See C. DOUGLAS FLOYD & E. THOMAS SULLIVAN, PRIVATE ANTITRUST
ACTIONS § 3.13, at 144 (1996) (declaring that there is "universal recognition
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cided that some union-employer agreements should be exempt
from the antitrust laws to balance the congressional policies
that favor collective bargaining under the NLRA and free and
open commercial competition under the Sherman Act.42 This
led to the judicially-constructed "nonstatutory antitrust ex-
emption" that covered agreements between unions and other
groups, such as employers.
The Supreme Court first directly discussed the criteria for
applying a nonstatutory antitrust exemption in United Mine
Workers of America v. Pennington4 3 and Amalgamated Meat
Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co.' In Pennington, a coal miners' union
negotiated a collective bargaining agreement that established
minimum wages that eventually forced small coal mining com-
panies from the market.45 The Court held that national labor
policy does not protect union-employer agreements that help
employers drive competitors from an industry.46 Such agree-
ments blatantly violate the Sherman Act by attempting to de-
crease competition in an industry without promoting "the
peaceful settlement of industrial disputes."47  Thus, even
that it would be senseless to immunize strikes, picketing, and other concerted
activities by a union designed to win favorable terms of employment from an
employer, but to condemn the collective bargaining agreement that embodies
those terms if the union succeeds"); see also Amalgamated Meat Cutters v.
Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689 (1965) (explaining that restraints imposed by
an employer and a union are not automatically exempt from the antitrust
laws); United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 662
(1965) (stating that the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts did not address
labor-management agreements).
42. Connell Construction Co., 421 U.S. at 622. For a discussion of Connell
Construction Co., see infra notes 52-55. See also FLOYD & SULLIVAN, supra
note 41, § 3.13, at 145-46 (stating that the Supreme Court was sensitive to the
central purposes of the federal antitrust and labor laws in creating a non-
statutory exemption, and that any decision to extend the exemption must
consider the purpose and effect of the activities and agreements in light of
antitrust and labor policies).
43. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
44. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
45. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 660. The union obtained the minimum wage
provision by agreeing not to oppose mechanization of the mines and not to
abandon its efforts to control the working time of the miners. Id. In addition
to increased wages, the mining companies gave the union increased welfare
fund payments and control over the management of the fund. Id. Competing
coal mines not party to the agreement were affected when the union and the
companies convinced Congress to establish industry-wide minimum wages in
the Walsh-Healey Act. Id.
46. Id. at 663.
47. Id. at 665-66. The Court acknowledged that the union-employer
agreement affected the product market for coal only indirectly, but did not
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though the agreement dealt with wages, a mandatory subject
of bargaining, it did not qualify for the nonstatutory exemp-
tion.48
In Jewel Tea, meat cutters' unions negotiated with gro-
cery store owners for shorter operating hours in grocery store
meat departments to limit their working hours.49 The plurality
held that national labor policy protected the union-employer
restriction on operating hours from the antitrust laws because
the agreement dealt with a mandatory subject of bargaining, 50
and the unions had a compelling interest in controlling work-
ing hours.51
Ten years after Pennington and Jewel Tea, the Court revis-
ited the nonstatutory exemption in Connell Construction Co.,
Inc. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100.52 In
Connell Construction Co., a construction union negotiated a
collective bargaining agreement that forced a contractor to
subcontract with only union members.5 3 The Court held that
union agreements with nonlabor groups to eliminate non-union
workers from the labor market will not qualify for the non-
statutory antitrust exemption because they afford unions con-
trol over the entire market, adversely affecting consumers by
raising prices.54 It also stressed that unions may not use an
agreement with an employer to control working conditions of
employees not party to that agreement.
consider this determinative. Id. at 664-65. The Court held instead that the
purpose and effect of the agreement to eliminate competitors outweighed the
arrangement's benefits to the union. Id.
48. Id. at 665.
49. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 679-80. The meat cutters unions represented
virtually all butchers in the city of Chicago. Id. at 680. After Jewel Tea, the
operator of a chain of retail grocery stores refused to agree to the operating
hours restriction and the unions authorized a strike. Id. at 681. Under the
threat of a strike, Jewel agreed to the restriction. Id.
50. Id. at 689-91; see supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing
§ 158(d) of the NLRA and the scope of the term "mandatory subjects of bargain-
ing").
51. Id. at 691. The Court described the unions' interest in working hours
as "immediate and direct." Id.
52. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
53. Id. at 619-20. The union was already party to a contract with a group
of mechanical contractors that provided for exclusive contracting to union
members. Id. at 619. When Connell, a general building contractor, refused to
sign the agreement, the union picketed at Connell's construction site and ap-
proximately 150 workers walked off the job. Id. at 620. Connell signed the
agreement under protest and brought an antitrust suit against the union. Id.
54. Id. at 624-25.
55. Id. The Supreme Court had used similar reasoning to invalidate an
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In addition to case-specific analysis of whether to apply the
exemption in Pennington, Jewel Tea, and Connell Construction
Co., the Supreme Court has discussed general guidelines for
applying the nonstatutory antitrust exemption. When groups
other than unions are acting,56 the Court has repeatedly
warned that the nonstatutory exemption only applies to re-
straints that further federal labor and antitrust policies.5 7  In
Connell Construction Co., for example, the Court declared that
the agreement to exclude all non-union subcontractors "con-
travenes antitrust policies to a degree not justified by congres-
sional labor policy, and therefore cannot claim a nonstatutory
exemption from the antitrust laws."58
In addition to the balancing requirement, the Court also
mentioned general factors that support application of the ex-
emption. A reduction of competition confined to a labor mar-
ket, rather than a product market, is one such factor.59 In
agreement among electrical subcontractors and manufacturers of electrical
equipment that excluded all non-union subcontractors from the market in Al-
len Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U.S. 797, 799 (1945). The Court
held that such agreements became industry-wide understandings, foreclosing
the opportunity for independent collective bargaining for other manufacturers
and subcontractors. Id. at 799-800. Thus, the agreements had the effect of
establishing a monopoly for electrical equipment, causing increases in price to
consumers in direct violation of the Sherman Act. Id. at 800-01. For further
analysis of the Court's reasoning in Allen Bradley, see infra note 71.
56. A union acting alone qualifies for the statutory exemption even when
a court disagrees with the wisdom or appropriateness of the union's conduct.
United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941); see supra notes 36-40
and accompanying text (describing the purpose and scope of the statutory ex-
emption as provided in the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts).
57. For a discussion of the distinction between courts' level of scrutiny
where nonlabor, as opposed to solely labor, parties are involved, see FLOYD &
SULLIVAN, supra note 41, § 3.13, at 145 (noting that conduct falling within the
provisions of the Clayton or Norris-LaGuardia Acts is exempt from antitrust
liability regardless of the actor's purpose or the agreement's effect, but that
courts take into account both purpose and effect when deciding whether to
extend the nonstatutoy exemption).
58. 421 U.S. 616, 625 (1975).
59. United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 662-63
(1965); see also Connell Construction Co., Inc., v. Plumbers & Steamfitters
Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 623 (1975) (stating that "[clurtailment of
competition based on efficiency is neither a goal of federal labor policy nor a
necessary effect of the elimination of competition among workers. Moreover,
competition based on efficiency is a positive value that the antitrust laws
strive to protect"); Kieran M. Corcoran, Note, When Does the Buzzer Sound?:
The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1045, 1052 (1994) (stating that direct restraints on product markets will only
qualify for the nonstatutory exemption when courts find it "necessary to pro-
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Pennington, for example, the Court held that the agreement
between the union and the mining company fixing prices at
which the employer could sell coal would not qualify for an ex-
emption because it directly and immediately affected the prod-
uct market.6° This principle is merely a presumption, however,
not a hard and fast rule. Agreements that predominantly con-
cern a labor market will not qualify for an antitrust exemption
if they allow a party to gain control of an entire product mar-
ket, indirectly increasing consumer prices.61 Furthermore,
significant anticompetitive effects on a product market do not
automatically subject an agreement to the antitrust laws. In
Jewel Tea, for example, the Court acknowledged that the re-
straint on operating hours directly affected the product market
by reducing the hours during which consumers could purchase
meat.62 The Court extended the nonstatutory exemption to the
union, however, because of employee concerns about working
hours.6 3
A second factor the Court considers is whether the agree-
ment concerns "mandatory subjects" of bargaining. If it does, it
tect fundamental employee interests") (citing Connell Construction Co., 421
U.S. at 623).
60. 381 U.S. at 663.
61. Connell Construction Co., 421 U.S. at 624-25. A plaintiff must show
effects of some kind on a product market because pursuant to the Clayton Act,
the labor of human beings cannot be considered a "commodity." 15 U.S.C. § 6
(1994). Thus, a restraint on the labor market, without more, does not reduce
competition in a product market and is not the type of restraint Congress in-
tended the antitrust laws to prohibit. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 664; see, e.g.,
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 500-04 (1940) (distinguishing be-
tween employer restrictions on wages designed to effect increased market
prices and an injury to consumers, which are subject to the antitrust laws,
and restraints on competition among employees in the sale of their services,
which are not condemned by the antitrust laws). But cf. Radovich v. National
Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1957) (refusing to extend antitrust ex-
emption to professional football because of the effects of the labor market
upon consumers); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar
Co., 334 U.S. 219, 235-38 (1948) (holding that the Sherman Act "does not con-
fine its protection to consumers, or to purchasers, or to competitors, or to sell-
ers"); Cordova v. Bache & Co., Inc., 321 F. Supp. 600, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(stating that Congress, when passing the statutory exemption, was concerned
with employees' rights rather than the right of employers to fix wages paid to
employees, making the employer subject to antitrust liability); BERNARD D.
MELTZER, LABOR LAW 515 (2d ed. 1977) (stating that while agreements that
only affect a product market indirectly have a greater chance of qualifying for
the nonstatutory exemption, the line between labor and product markets is
often unclear because wage costs often directly affect product prices and em-
ployers' ability to secure supply).
62. 381 U.S. 676, 691 (1965).
63. Id.
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is more likely to qualify for an antitrust exemption' than an
agreement involving only "permissive subjects."6 Indeed, us-
ing the antitrust laws to attack agreements related to manda-
tory subjects would severely frustrate the goals of the labor
laws.66 Again, however, a finding that an agreement deals with
a mandatory subject of bargaining is not conclusive. The Su-
preme Court has cautioned that restraints involving manda-
tory subjects will not qualify for the exemption if they violate
other laws.67
Finally, the Supreme Court emphasized that it will more
readily apply the nonstatutory exemption when the defendant
in an antitrust action first engaged in "bona fide, arm's-length
bargaining" on the issue.68 Although the Court did not define
"bona fide, arm's-length" negotiation, 69 lower courts eventually
incorporated this criterion into a three-pronged test to deter-
mine whether to apply the exemption.70 When deciding
64. In Jewel Tea the Court stated that because the NLRA mandates that
parties in a collective bargaining relationship bargain about wages, hours of
employment, and other working conditions, labor law policy "weighs heavily in
favor of antitrust exemption for agreements on these subjects." Id. at 689; see
also Corcoran, supra note 59, at 1051 (stating that agreements concerning
mandatory subjects are shielded by the antitrust exemption provided they are
of "immediate and direct concern" to union members, and that such an ex-
emption will apply even if the restraint has significant effects on competition
in a product market).
65. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing Borg-Warner
and courts' interpretation of "mandatory" and "permissive" bargaining sub-
jects).
66. See, e.g., Pennington, 381 U.S. at 664-65 (acknowledging that the de-
cision by Congress and the National Labor Relations Board to place some is-
sues within the realm of "compulsory subject[s] of bargaining" has great rele-
vance to the application of the nonstatutory exemption).
67. Id. The Court cautioned that "there are limits to what a union or an
employer may offer or extract in the name of wages, and because they must
bargain does not mean that the agreement reached may disregard other
laws." Id. at 665.
68. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 689-90. The Court also stated that finding that
a union acted pursuant to its own interests as they related to a mandatory
subject of bargaining was relevant to the application of the nonstatutory ex-
emption. Id.; see supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text (providing a more
detailed discussion of the facts and holding of Jewel Tea).
69. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 690. In affirming the district court's finding
that the parties indeed engaged in genuine bargaining over the restricted
working hours, the Court merely noted that the parties had participated in
several collective bargaining sessions. Id. at 680. In fact, the employers had
made numerous requests that the parties lift the restriction on operating
hours, all of which the unions rejected. Id.
70. See Shawn Treadwell, An Examination of the Nonstatutory Labor Ex-
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whether to extend the nonstatutory exemption, therefore,
courts may look to certain plus-factors but must balance the in-
terests of employees and employers in establishing working
conditions through collective bargaining with the interests of
consumers in maintaining a competitive business economy.71
D. APPLICATION OF THE NONSTATUTORY EXEMPTION TO POST-
IMPASSE EMPLOYER ACTIONS
Supreme Court cases that discuss the scope of the non-
statutory exemption involved agreements with unions that
employers challenged on antitrust grounds.72  Before Brown,
the Court did not expressly address whether it would apply a
different level of scrutiny to strictly non-union actions, such as
lockouts and unilateral changes in working conditions. 73 Sev-
eral circuit courts have addressed the issue of applying the
nonstatutory exemption to unilateral employer conduct, how-
ever.74 In Mackey v. National Football League," the Court of
emption from the Antitrust Laws, in the Context of Professional Sports, 23
FoRDHAM UIRB. L.J. 955, 963 (1996) (stating that agreements will not qualify
for the nonstatutory labor exemption if they are not the product of "good faith
arm's-length negotiation" between the parties to the labor dispute).
71. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, International Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 806 (1945). The Court followed this approach in Jewel
Tea, exempting a restriction of operating hours from the antitrust laws de-
spite adverse effects on the product market. 381 U.S. at 691. The Court
characterized its holding as a balancing of the restraintfs "relative impact on
the product market and the interests of union members." Id. at 690 n.5; see
also Pennington, 381 U.S. at 665 (stating that courts are charged with
"harmonizing the Sherman Act with the national policy expressed in the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act of promoting the peaceful settlement of industrial
disputes by subjecting labor-management controversies to the mediatory in-
fluence of negotiation'") (citing Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379
U.S. 203, 211 (1964)); Corcoran, supra note 59, at 1052 (describing the task of
applying the nonstatutory exemption as "accommodat[ing] the competing con-
gressional policies favoring collective bargaining and free competition").
72. See, e.g., Connell Construction Co., 421 U.S. at 622 (stating that em-
ployees have a strong interest in uniting to eliminate competition related to
wages and working conditions); Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 689-90 (holding that
the nonstatutory exemption will apply to restraints imposed as part of a union's
attempt to obtain employment provisions as long as the union engages in
"bona fide, arm's-length bargaining").
73. See Corcoran, supra note 59, at 1052 (remarking that Supreme Court
precedent on applying the nonstatutory exemption primarily discusses union
interests and activities).
74. See, e.g., Mid-America Reg'l Bargaining Ass'n v. Will County Carpen-
ters, 675 F.2d 881, 893 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that an employer agreement
implemented aifer expiration of the collective bargaining agreement was pro-
tected by the nonstatutory labor exemption); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v.
Wetterau Foods, 597 F.2d 133, 135-36 (8th Cir. 1979) (holding that employer
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Appeals for the Eighth Circuit formulated a three-pronged test
to determine whether an employer's interest in engaging in
certain conduct to reach a collective bargaining agreement
outweighed the antitrust laws' preference for free and open
competition in the market.76  First, the restraint must
"primarily affect" only the parties to the collective bargaining
relationship. 7  Second, the restraint must concern a manda-
tory subject of collective bargaining.7 Third, the restraint
must be the product of "bona fide arm's-length bargaining."79
Applying this test to the NFL's unilaterally imposed regulation
of player compensation, the court held that, while the players
and owners included the rule in previous agreements, they had
never negotiated the rule at length. 0 Hence, the court con-
cluded that the antitrust exemption did not apply.8'
agreements adopted following a strike were exempt from antitrust laws de-
spite the resultant denial of employment to some employees).
75. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977). In
Mackey, professional football players brought an antitrust suit against club
owners after reaching an impasse in collective bargaining because the owners
had unilaterally imposed a rule regulating player compensation without ap-
proval from the players' union. Id. at 612. The rule, commonly known as the
Rozelle Rule, provided that upon expiration of a player contract, a player may
sign with a different team only if the new team provides mutually satisfactory
compensation to the former team, subject to review by the then-League
Commissioner, Pete Rozelle. Id. at 609 n.1.
The owners conceded that they introduced the Rozelle Rule unilaterally
in 1963. Id. at 610. They contended, however, that the players accepted the
rule by agreeing to the 1968 collective bargaining agreement, which incorpo-
rated by reference the NFL Constitution and Bylaws, which contained the Ro-
zelle Rule. Id. at 612-13.
76. Id. at 613-14. The Eighth Circuit stressed that the application of the
nonstatutory exemption turned on "whether the relevant federal labor policy
is deserving of pre-eminence over federal antitrust policy under the circum-
stances of the particular case." Id. at 613.
77. Id. at 614.
78. Id.
79. Id. For a different wording of the third requirement, see Amalga-
mated Meat Cutters v. Wetterau Foods, 597 F.2d 133, 135-36 (inquiring
whether unilateral employer conduct complied with the provisions of the
NLRA, including the duty to bargain in good faith, before extending the non-
statutory exemption).
80. Mackey, 543 F.2d 615-16.
8L Id. at 616. The court proceeded to analyze the Rozelle Rule in light of
the Sherman Act, stating that courts have often applied the Sherman Act to
employer-imposed restraints on player-services markets. Id. at 617. The
court affirmed the district court's findings that the restraint violated the anti-
trust laws under the rule of reason because it prevented players from selling
their services in a freely competitive market. Id. at 620. The Supreme Court
chose not to review the case. Mackey v. NFL, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
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The Mackey test has served as the foundation for subse-
quent decisions applying the exemption to unilateral employer
conduct.82 Indeed, although the Mackey court stated that the
test merely facilitated weighing labor and antitrust policies,
courts have treated it like a "checklist,"83 applying the exemp-
82. See Corcoran, supra note 59, at 1058 & n.96 (stating "[tihe Mackey
test has become the standard used to decide labor exemption issues in player
restraint cases" and listing cases in which courts have followed the Mackey
test).
83. The term "checklist" refers to a test that considers only certain factors
without undertaking a balancing of relevant antitrust and labor policies. The
Eighth Circuit purported to follow Mackey in Powell v. National Football
League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1299 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040
(1991). In that case, professional football players brought an antitrust suit
against club owners for unilaterally imposing the Free Agency Rule, under
which a team could prevent a player from contracting with another team by
exercising a right of first refusal and matching the competing club's offer. Id.
at 1295. The rule is also known as the Right of First Refusal/Compensation
Rule. Id. The players and owners first incorporated the rule into a collective
bargaining agreement in 1977. In 1982, after a 57-day strike, the parties
again included a modified version of the rule in a collective bargaining agree-
ment. Id. at 1296. Applying the Mackey test, the court found that the agree-
ment affected only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship, con-
cerned a mandatory subject of bargaining, and was the product of bona fide,
arm's-length bargaining. Id. at 1298-99. Thus, the court applied the exemp-
tion and held the restraint on competition in the player services market to be
immune from antitrust challenge even though the employers instituted it af-
ter the bargaining impasse. Id. at 1304.
Under Powell, employers may unilaterally implement terms of employ-
ment after impasse if the provisions pass the Mackey test and are "reasonably
comprehended" within pre-impasse proposals. Id. at 1302-03 (citing Laborers
Health & Welfare Tr. Fund v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co., Inc., 484
U.S. 539, 544 n.5 (1988)). The court in Powell essentially revised the third
Mackey prong to require that parties comply with the NLRA's "good faith bar-
gaining" requirement, instead of Mackey's "bona fide arm's-length bargaining"
standard. The Supreme Court denied certiorari to review the Powell decision.
Powell v. NFL, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991). For a more detailed discussion of per-
missive employer actions after impasse, see supra note 35 and accompanying
text (describing the Laborers Health "reasonably comprehended within pre-
impasse proposals" standard in relation to the general labor law duty on all
collective bargaining parties to bargain in good faith).
The Second Circuit also followed the Mackey test in National Basketball
Ass'n v. Williams. 45 F.3d 684, 693 (2d Cir. 1995). In Williams, professional
basketball players brought an antitrust suit against club owners for unilat-
erally imposing three provisions, including a right of first refusal similar to
the provision in Powell, after a collective bargaining agreement had expired.
Id. at 686. The court cited Powell in holding that the nonstatutory exemption
continued to apply to unilateral employer conduct after impasse because all
three elements of the Mackey test were met and the restraints otherwise
complied with the labor laws. Id. at 692-93. The court held that the provi-
sions were "reasonably comprehended within pre-impasse proposals" because
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tion without mentioning antitrust considerations if the three
criteria are satisfied.84 The Supreme Court has neither
adopted nor rejected the Mackey test as it applies to employer
conduct after impasse. 85 Thus, before Brown, Mackey still
provided lower courts with the clearest method for determining
whether to apply the nonstatutory exemption.
they merely continued the status quo, thereby furthering the goals of the la-
bor laws by encouraging continued collective bargaining. Id.
The District Court for the District of New Jersey applied the Mackey test
in Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960, 964 (D.N.J.
1987). In Bridgeman, the National Basketball Association (NBA) owners im-
plemented a post-impasse maximum club salary provision (a "salary cap"),
which had been part of collective bargaining agreements from 1983 until the
expiration of the agreement in 1987. Id. at 962-63. The court found that the
NBA owners' agreement implementing a salary cap met all three Mackey ele-
ments, concluding that an employer may satisfy the "bona fide, arm's-length
bargaining" prong by maintaining a reasonable belief that the provision, or a
"close variant" of it, will be adopted in the next collective bargaining agree-
ment. Id. at 967. The Bridgeman court also stated in dicta that its applica-
tion of the Mackey test did not stand for the proposition that employers could
claim the exemption indefinitely simply by maintaining the status quo provi-
sions. Id. at 966. Rather, employers must continue to bargain about the con-
tested terms in good faith; otherwise, unions would refuse to enter into any
collective bargaining agreements for fear that they would be forever bound by
them. Id.
84. The Powell court failed to recite the operative language in Mackey
that the "test" was actually a means of balancing labor and antitrust issues in
a particular case. Rather, it stated that the antitrust laws had no application
whatsoever under the circumstances. 930 F.2d at 1304. In dissent, two
judges argued that the majority in Powell implicitly overruled Mackey because
it refused to consider the antitrust policies at stake. Id. at 1305 (Heaney, J.,
dissenting); id. at 1309 (Lay, J., dissenting in denial of rehearing en banc).
85. The Court has simply indicated the extremes of parties' rights during
the collective bargaining process. "[Bloth employer and union may bargain to
impasse over [terms and conditions of employment] and use the economic
weapons at their disposal to attempt to secure their respective aims." First
Natl Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 675 (1981). On the other
hand, some provisions are so inherently prejudicial to unions and so devoid of
economic justification that no showing of antiunion animus is required to
subject the provision to the antitrust laws. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB,
380 U.S. 300, 311 (1965). The Court described the process of determining
whether employer action promotes the federal labor policies as the "far more
delicate task.., of weighing the interests of employees in concerted activity
against the interest of the employer in operating [his or her] business in a
particular manner." Id. at 312 (citing NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S.
221, 229 (1963)).
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II. BROWN V. PRO FOOTBALL
In Brown v. Pro Football,86 the Supreme Court did not ex-
pressly establish an approach for lower courts to follow in ap-
plying the nonstatutory exemption. It implicitly adopted the
first two prongs of the Mackey test, but refused to apply the
third and inquire whether employers had bargained in good
faith." Instead, the Court presumed that the owners' resolu-
tion did not violate labor law or policy.88
A. THE BROWN COURT APPLIED THE FIRST TWO PRONGS OF THE
MACKEY TEST
The Court's holding that the owner resolution fixing devel-
opmental squad salaries fell within the protections of the non-
statutory exemption briefly addressed the first two elements of
Mackey.89 Without discussing specific facts, the Court stated
that the employer conduct "concerned only the parties to the
collective-bargaining relationship" and "involved a matter that
the parties were required to negotiate collectively." 0 Thus, the
Court acknowledged Mackey's first two prongs.91
B. THE SUPREME COURT DID NOT IMPLEMENT MACKEY'S THIRD
PRONG
Despite its adoption of the first two prongs, the Court did
not implement Mackey's third prong. Specifically, the Court
refused to examine whether the owners' developmental squad
resolution was the subject of bona fide, arm's-length bargain-
ing.92 Instead, the Court inquired whether the employers'
agreement violated labor law or policy. 3 The Court abbrevi-
ated this inquiry by assuming that, under the facts of the case,
86. 116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996). In Brown, NFL owners unilaterally imposed a
resolution fixing scrimmage squad player salaries at $1,000 per week. Id. at
2119. The players claimed that the owners violated the antitrust laws, and
the owners claimed that they qualified for the nonstatutory exemption. Id.;
see supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text (stating the facts and procedural
posture of Brown).
87. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text (laying out the elements
of the Mackey test).
88. Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2121.
89. Id. at 2127.
90. Id.
91. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text (describing the ele-
ments of the Mackey test).
92. See supra notes 75-79 (describing the elements of the Mackey test).
93. Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2121.
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the employers' conduct was "unobjectionable as a matter of la-
bor law and policy."94 The first portion of the Court's opinion
identified factors that gave rise to that assumption.
The Supreme Court first emphasized that the NLRA al-
ready regulates post-impasse unilateral employer action in-
volving a mandatory subject of bargaining.95  Such conduct
constitutes an unfair labor practice if the implemented provi-
sions are not "reasonably comprehended" within pre-impasse
proposals96 or if the employer failed to bargain on the issue in
good faith.97 The Court explained, however, that the NLRB
has explicitly condoned several forms of unilateral employer
action.98 Furthermore, it noted that the NLRB extensively
regulated unilateral, post-impasse conduct. 99 The Court con-
cluded that such extensive coverage signified that impasse and
unilateral action after impasse are "integral part[s] of the bar-
gaining process."10 Thus, it rejected the players' contention
that even if the nonstatutory exemption applied, it expired at
impasse.1 1 According to the Court, the bargaining process
continues during and after one impasse is reached 0 2 because
impasse is often a temporary deadlock that may recur
throughout collective bargaining.1 3 The NLRA, therefore, al-
94. Id. The Court's presumption that the owners' agreement did not vio-
late the labor laws also shaped its framing of the issue presented in the case:
"Does [the exemption] apply to an agreement among. several employers bar-gaining together to implement after impasse the terms of their last best good-
faith wage offer?" Id. (emphasis added).
95. Id.
96. The Court noted that the phrase "reasonably comprehended' within
the employer's preimpasse proposals" generally means "the last rejected pro-
posals." Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2123-24; see also PHIIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOvENKAmP,
ANTITRUST LAW 278 (Supp. 1996) (discussing bargaining practices exempt
from antitrust restrictions). The Court pointed out that unit-wide lockouts,
the use of replacement workers, and joint employer preparation and bargain-
ing in a multiemployer bargaining unit are not unfair labor practices. 116 S.
Ct. at 2124.
99. Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2121.
100. Id.
10L Id. at 2124.
102. Id. at 2125.
103. Id. at 2124-25 (citing Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv. v. NLRB, 454
U.S. 404, 412 (1982)). Furthermore, the Court noted that impasse often dif-
fers from actual bargaining only in degree and that parties sometimes ma-
nipulate impasse as part of their bargaining strategy. Id. at 2125.
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ready regulated the employers' fixed-salary provision because
it was part of the broad collective bargaining process.' 4
Finally, the Court stated that the nonstatutory exemption
derives from the federal labor statutes, which delegate the
power to make and interpret rules to the NLRB.'05 The ex-
emption's purpose is to promote a congressional preference
that the NLRB, rather than "antitrust courts," 06 define the ac-
ceptable parameters of industrial conflict resolution.107  The
Court noted that Congress has established "free and private
collective bargaining" as the best method of resolving labor-
management disputes. 08 The Court concluded, therefore, that
the antitrust laws should have limited application in the col-
lective bargaining context because Congress, through the labor
laws, authorized the NLRB to determine desirable collective
bargaining policy.'09
Considering these factors, the Court indicated that, if it
subjected the owners' conduct in the present case to antitrust
scrutiny, the "antitrust courts" would dictate how collective
bargaining should proceed. 10 The Court considered this unac-
ceptable because these courts sometimes find antitrust liability
based on "little more than uniform behavior among competi-
tors.""' Furthermore, if players could avail themselves of anti-
104. Id. at 2127. The Court stated that the employer conduct "grew out of,
and was directly related to, the lawful operation of the [collective] bargaining
process." Id.
105. Id. at 2120.
106. For a discussion of the artificial term "antitrust courts" and the Su-
preme Court's use of it, see infra note 172 stating that there is no regulatory
agency charged with ruling on questions of antitrust law, but that all federal
courts have jurisdiction to rule on antitrust questions because the Sherman
and Clayton Acts are federal statutes. The Court described the NLRB as a
"single expert administrative body," compared to "nonexpert antitrust judges
and juries" that would create a "web of detailed rules" to govern the collective
bargaining process. 116 S. Ct. at 2123.
107. Id. at 2120-21.
108. Id. at 2120.
109. Id. The Court stated that Congress designed the labor laws to en-
courage genuine collective bargaining and to subject industrial conflicts to the
"mediatory influence of negotiation." Id. at 2120-21 (quoting Fibreboard Pa-
per Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964)).
110. Id. at 2122.
111. Id. The Court cited antitrust cases condemning uniform employer
conduct as violative of the Sherman Act. Id. These cases are all distinguish-
able from Brown, however, because they involved agreements aiming to fix
artificially high prices or control output in a product market or both. For
cases holding that cooperation of some kind among sellers in a product market
violated the Sherman Act, see United States v. General Motors Corp., 384
1222 [Vol. 81:1201
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
trust remedies, the Court believed that owners could not act
after impasse without violating either a labor or antitrust pro-
vision. 12 Therefore, the Court assumed that agreements do
not violate labor law or policy if the NLRB has not found them
to constitute unfair labor practices."3
The Supreme Court acknowledged that professional ath-
letes have special individual talents and more bargaining
power than most unionized employees. 14  Nonetheless, the
Court held that those differences do not entitle athletes to ad-
ditional legal advantages or give them an enhanced ability to
invoke the antitrust laws in negotiating with employers.11 5 The
Court concluded that the fixed-salary agreements concerned
only the parties to the collective bargaining, involved manda-
tory subjects of bargaining, and did not violate labor law or
policy. 1 6 Thus, the Court held that the NFL owners qualified
for the nonstatutory antitrust exemption.
1 7
III. BROWN REJECTS A PRO-EMPLOYEE UNDER-
STANDING OF LABOR LAW BUT DOES NOT GRANT
EMPLOYERS ABSOLUTE ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
At first glance, the Supreme Court in Brown appeared to
adopt an approach similar to the three-pronged Mackey test,
extending the nonstatutory antitrust exemption to all employer
U.S. 127, 142-43 (1966); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781,
809-11 (1946); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 275 (1942); In-
terstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226-27 (1939).
112. Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2122-23. The Court analogized a discussion
among NFL owners about setting a low wage level for scrimmage players to
discussions among theater owners about fixing artificially high admission
prices. Id. at 2123 (comparing Interstate Circuit, 306 U.S. at 222-23). The
Court stated that owners would automatically violate either the labor laws for
implementing a provision that was different than those of other employers, or
the antitrust laws, by cooperating with other employers in determining which
provision to implement. Id. at 2122-23.
113. Id. at 2121. The Court assumed that post-impasse conduct based on a
good faith offer by a multiemployer bargaining unit does not violate labor law
or policy. On this assumption, the Court concluded that the exemption ap-
plies to this conduct.
114. Id. at 2126. The Court named transport workers, coal miners, and
meat packers as examples of unionized workers that might not enjoy the kind
of "superior bargaining power" held by athletes. Id. The Court remarked that
professional athletes' increased bargaining power is evidenced by the fact that
athletes have "special individual talents" and often negotiate contracts indi-
vidually with employers. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2127.
117. Id.
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conduct that addresses mandatory subjects of bargaining, re-
lates only to the parties to the collective bargaining, and does
not violate labor law or policy. Upon closer scrutiny, however,
the Court's opinion differed significantly from lower court
opinions applying the Mackey test. The Court incorporated a
new understanding of labor policy and followed the traditional
balancing test established in Jewel Tea, Pennington, and Con-
nell Construction Co.,' As a result of these key differences
from Mackey, Brown indeed forces employees to seek redress
first through the NLRB, rather than the antitrust laws. It also
shows, however, that when employers have not violated the la-
bor laws, they are still subject to the antitrust laws. Thus, al-
though Brown tips the collective bargaining scales toward em-
ployers, it does not allow them to abuse the collective bargaining
process by negotiating superficially and reaching impasse in
order to unilaterally implement new terms of employment.
A. THE COURT'S PRESUMPTION THAT AGREEMENTS FURTHER
LABOR LAW POLICY PRESUMES CONGRESS DID NOT PASS
THE LABOR LAWS SOLELY TO PROTECT EMPLOYEES
In enacting the National Labor Relations Act, Congress in-
tended to promote industrial peace,119 specifically by restoring
equality of bargaining power between employees and employ-
ers.120 Senator Wagner, a dedicated proponent of the NLRA,
believed that the greatest problems facing workers before the
Act were depressed wages and the widening gap between em-
ployee wages and employer profits. 121  Therefore, in earlier
118. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (describing the balancing
test followed in Jewel Tea and Pennington); see also supra note 58 and accom-
panying text (describing the balancing test followed in Connell Construction
Co.).
119. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (reciting Congress's goals in
passing the NLRB).
120. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724,
753 (1985) (finding that "[t]he NLRA's declared purpose is to remedy '[tihe
inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full
freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are
organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association'") (quoting
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994)); see also United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219,
231 & n.2 (1941) (describing the goals of the labor laws as protecting workers
who are helpless to exercise their liberty of contract and to obtain acceptable
terms of employment by guaranteeing them the right to bargain through a
representative of their own choosing).
121. See National Labor Relations Board: Hearings on S. 1958 Before the
Senate Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 74th Cong. 34-35 (1935) (statement of
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nonstatutory exemption cases, the Supreme Court analyzed
whether a proposed provision "furthered labor policy" by ask-
ing whether it helped to balance the bargaining power of em-
ployees and employers or to distribute wealth more evenly be-
tween employees and employers.
19
In Brown, however, the Court focused on a fundamentally
different view of labor policy. The predominant understanding
of the labor laws today is that they do not establish a pro-
employee framework for industrial relations.123 Indeed, since
Congress passed the Taft-Hartley amendments in 1947, the
NLRB and courts consider the labor laws to be essentially neu-
tral and encourage vigorous collective bargaining as the most
effective means of resolving labor-management disputes. 12 4
The Brown Court supported this view, describing modern labor
policy as encouraging resolution of industrial conflict through
"free and private collective bargaining."125 Therefore, the Court
Sen. Wagner) (stating that the public was being injured by employers' refusal
to spread their profits to the consuming public, resulting in excess plant ca-
pacities and the piling up of capital reserves); see also 79 CONG. REC. 6183-84
(1925) (reprinted radio address of Sen. Wagner).
122. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (citing the Supreme Court's
explanation of what constituted "furthering the goals of the labor laws" in its
original nonstatutory exemption jurisprudence).
123. See COX ET AL., supra note 26, at 87 (describing the common under-
standing of the goals of the labor laws after the amendments to the NLRA as
placing the government "in the center" rather than on the side of employees
and stating that the amendments symbolize "an abandonment of the policy of
affirmatively encouraging the spread of union organization"); see also DANIEL
R. ERNST, LAWYERS AGAINST LABOR 234-35 (1995) (discussing Walter Gordon
Merrites fight against legislation encouraging unionization).
124 See supra note 27 (stating that the NLRB has emphasized that the
best way to effect industrial peace is through vigorous collective bargaining).
The view that the labor laws should not tip the bargaining scales in favor of
unions is influenced by the significant gains made by unions through both
collective bargaining and successful lobbying for workplace legislation, in ad-
dition to the well-publicized violence and corruption within the union struc-
ture. See DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 22, at 35-40 (analyzing reasons
for the decreasing protections the labor laws offer unions and noting that,
from 1935 to 1947, unions became extremely powerful economic organizations,
causing widespread public fear of powerful union bosses); Craig Becker, Labor
Law Outside the Employment Relation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1527, 1528-39 (1996)
(discussing the shrinking categories of workers covered under the NLRA be-
cause of the Taft-Hartley amendments and employment trends such as
"outsourcing" and "subcontracting"); David Charny, The Employee Welfare
State in Transition, 74 TEx. L. REv. 1601, 1611-12 (1996) (positing that work-
ers have few workplace protections that are immune from employer abuse de-
spite the general belief that employees have gained extensive employment se-
curity).
125. Brown v. Pro Football, 116 S. Ct. 2116, 2120 (1996).
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did not require that the employers' resolution improve employ-
ees' ability to secure favorable working conditions, as it had in
earlier cases. 126 Instead, it merely asked whether the agree-
ment was related to the broad collective bargaining process. 127
This inquiry favors employers because, under the old standard,
employers could not show they were "furthering labor policy"
unless they acted specifically to benefit employees' interests
during collective bargaining, something employers rarely do.
The Court also assisted employers by creating a presump-
tion that agreements further labor policy as long as they are
reached in connection with the "collective bargaining process,"
including impasse and the unilateral implementation of em-
ployment terms after impasse. 128 Thus, even though the em-
ployers in Brown acted unilaterally, the resolution "furthered
federal labor policy" 129 because the parties were still negotiat-
ing a new collective bargaining agreement and the owners were
merely attempting to force the players back to the bargaining
table. 3 ° This recognition of the substantial shift in labor law
policy favors joint employer groups by establishing that they
may act in their own interest and still "further labor law pol-
icy," thereby falling within the nonstatutory exemption to the
antitrust laws.
B. THE COURT ASSISTED EMPLOYERS BY PLACING UNFAIR
LABOR PRACTICE ISSUES SOLELY WITHIN THE
JURISDICTION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD
Under Mackey's third prong, courts evaluated whether
parties to collective bargaining had negotiated at arm's length
before implementing an agreement. 3' In Brown, however, the
126. Id. at 2120; see also supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing
the traditional Supreme Court requirement that agreements further unions'
cause before applying the nonstatutory exemption).
127. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (describing the Brown
Court's abbreviated inquiry and extremely broad definition of the "collective-
bargaining process").
128. See supra notes 100-104 and accompanying text (discussing the con-
cept of "impasse" and its relevance in the collective bargaining process).
129. Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2127.
130. In dicta, the Court suggested that the "collective bargaining process"
continues until the bargaining relationship collapses, either through union
decertification or "defunctness" of the multiemployer bargaining unit. Id.
131. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text (articulating the ele-
ments of Mackey).
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Court stressed the NLRB's responsibility for determining ac-
ceptable bargaining behavior.13 2 The Court thereby established
a presumption that the party imposing an agreement does not
violate labor laws as long as that party has not committed an
unfair labor practice. 133  By creating this presumption, the
Court refused to ask whether a given agreement is the subject
of bona fide arm's-length negotiation, thereby respecting the
NLRB's authority to determine whether labor law violations
have occurred.
134
The Supreme Court therefore favored employers by requir-
ing that employees seek labor law sanctions, which have se-
verely limited remedies, 135 before attempting to use the anti-
trust laws with their more effective treble damages. 136 The
NFL owners in Brown may not have negotiated in good faith,
137
but as long as the players did not invoke the protections of the
labor laws to challenge the employers' resolution, the Court
presumed that they had.138 Despite the presumption in favor of
132. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's in-
tention, when passing the NLRA, to encourage genuine collective bargaining);
see also DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 22, at 1576-79 (stating that the
provisions of the NLRA are administered by the NLRB and noting that courts
may review NLRB decisions not to issue complaints pursuant to unfair labor
practice charges only in extreme cases).
133. The Brown Court does not expressly state that the players did not
bring unfair labor practice charges, but the record in the case does not men-
tion such proceedings.
134. Whether an agreement resulted from arm's-length bargaining de-
pends on whether a party bargained for an issue in good faith. Congress
placed determination of that particular issue within the NLRB's jurisdiction
under § 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994). The Eighth Circuit in
Powell reached a similar conclusion, asking first whether the agreement was
the subject of arm's-length bargaining, and then inquiring whether the
agreement had violated any labor laws. See Powell v. National Football
League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1298-99 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040
(1991).
135. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text (discussing the reme-
dies available to the NLRB and many commentators' beliefs that these reme-
dies are impotent against employers with bargaining power greater than their
opposing unions, and vice versa).
136. See supra note 18 (discussing the treble damages provision of the
Clayton Act to deter business owners from violating the antitrust laws).
137. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (describing the negotiation
process followed by the owners before implementing the fixed-salary resolu-
tion); see also Cox, supra note 31, at 1412-13 and accompanying text (stating
that going through the motions of bargaining, otherwise referred to as
"surface bargaining," undermines the collective bargaining process as much as
outright refusals to negotiate).
138. Brown v. Pro Football, 116 S. Ct. 2116, 2121 (1996).
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employers, the Court did not explicitly note its departure from
the Mackey test. To respect the NLRB's jurisdiction, however,
lower courts should acknowledge Brown by refraining from
analyzing substantive labor law questions in the future.
C. BROWN FOLLOWED A BALANCING TEST THAT DOES NOT
EXEMPT ALL UNILATERAL EMPLOYER CONDUCT
In applying the nonstatutory exemption to the owners'
agreement,139 the Brown Court does not explicitly acknowledge
that it is adopting either the Mackey approach or its own
"checklist" approach. 4 It also fails to mention the traditional
approach it established in Jewel Tea, Pennington, and Connell
Construction Co. Courts should interpret Brown as following
the traditional balancing test because any approach that does
not balance labor with antitrust policy will (1) implicitly over-
rule Supreme Court precedent, (2) encourage employers to
abuse the collective bargaining process, and (3) frustrate fed-
eral antitrust policies.
When it created the nonstatutory antitrust exemption for
nonlabor groups, the Supreme Court expressly discussed ac-
tivities that did and did not qualify.141 None of those cases re-
semble Brown, however, because in those cases the players' as-
sociation did not enter into an agreement to obtain better
working conditions, 42 the parties did not try to drive competi-
tors from the industry,143 and the union did not try to force the
owners to hire only union labor." Nonetheless, the Court also
discussed factors that weigh in favor of extending the exemp-
tion in its early nonstatutory exemption decisions.1 45 Applying
139. Id. 2127.
140. See supra note 83 (describing the term "checklist approach").
141. See supra notes 43-71 and accompanying text (describing the holdings
of Jewel Tea, Pennington, and Connell Construction Co.).
142. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (observing that the unions
in Jewel Tea insisted on restricted operating hours of meat departments to
improve their working conditions).
143. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (stating that the union in
Pennington agreed to allow the owner to increase mechanization of the mines
to drive competitors from the market and to increase wages).
144. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (noting that the union in
Connell Construction Co. used its industry-wide agreement to prevent the
owner from hiring any non-union workers).
145. See supra notes 56-71 and accompanying text (acknowledging that the
Court will more readily apply the nonstatutory exemption to agreements af-
fecting labor markets than it will to agreements affecting product markets,
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those factors to Brown, the resolution fixing developmental
squad salaries concerned a mandatory subject of bargaining,
primarily involved a labor rather than a product market, and
had been negotiated to some extent by the parties. 146 Thus, in
Brown, these factors created a strong presumption for applying
the nonstatutory exemption.
If the Brown Court was applying the traditional balancing
test, it would note this presumption and proceed to balance la-
bor with antitrust concerns. 147 The owners' action promoted
labor law policy because it attempted to force the players to
continue collective bargaining, the NLRB's preferred method of
resolving labor disputes.1 48 Therefore, at this stage in the tra-
ditional approach, the players would have the burden of
showing compelling antitrust policies that override the labor
policy of encouraging vigorous collective bargaining.1 49 Analyz-
ing the antitrust interest in Brown, there were three ways in
which the owners could have used the resolution. The owners
could have passed the proceeds on to consumers by reducing
ticket prices, retained the funds as additional profits, or used
them to cover skyrocketing salaries of "franchise players."'5 °
None of these scenarios would cause actual "antitrust in-
jury," a decrease in output, an increase in price to consumers,
agreements involving mandatory subjects of bargaining, or agreements
reached after genuine, good-faith bargaining).
146. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text (articulating the hold-
ing of Brown and noting that the union had not brought unfair labor practice
charges, leading the Court to the conclusion that the players could not resort
to the antitrust remedies, despite the lack of significant bargaining on the de-
velopmental squad salaries).
147. See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text (describing the ele-
ments of the traditional nonstatutory exemption analysis and courts' inquiry
into the interests of both labor and antitrust law).
148. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (analyzing the Court's rea-
sons for holding that the owners' action furthered labor law policy).
149. See supra note 56-57 and accompanying text (describing the process
the Supreme Court followed in applying the traditional balancing test).
150. Franchise players have enough fan recognition and talent to single-
handedly boost spectator interest, event attendance, and owner revenues.
See, e.g., PAUL D. STAUDOHAR, THE SPORTS INDUSTRY AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 7 (2d ed. 1989) (stating that professional sports are subject to the
"star system," where exceptionally talented superstars "command vastly dis-
proportionate influence on their professions" and "derive exceptional in-
comes"); Mitch Truelock, Free Agency in the NFL: Evolution or Revolution?, 47
SMU L. REV. 1917, 1946 (1994) (describing the NFL's definition of "franchise
players" as veterans among the five highest paid at each position in the
league).
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or a general lessening of competition in a product market. 5 1 In
the first scenario, the owners' agreement would directly benefit
consumers. 52 In the second, all NFL owners would stand to
gain profits, and competitors would not be eliminated from the
industry, so there would be no effect on consumers. 53 In the
final scenario, investing the funds in the salary of a franchise
player would potentially make one team more competitive
against others in the league but would not negatively affect the
product of NFL football to consumers. Therefore, the owners'
use of the resolution would not have caused compelling anti-
trust problems.
Other unique circumstances in Brown made the players'
interest in bringing an antitrust claim even less compelling.
Because professional athletes have bargaining power far
greater than most workers,154 their employers are less likely to
engage in oppressive conduct. Furthermore, professional
sports involve benefits that accrue to developmental squad, or
151. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (defining the concept of an-
titrust injury and its limiting effect on the ability of plaintiffs to bring anti-
trust causes of action).
152. The antitrust laws prohibit unreasonable restraints of trade that sup-
press competition in product markets and result in increased prices and de-
creased purchasing power for consumers. See supra note 20. Courts gener-
ally uphold restraints that result in reduced costs to owners and lower prices
for consumers because they increase economic efficiency, at least in the sense
that they help the general public and do not give owners monopoly profits.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text (describing the rule of reason and
the factors that courts consider to determine whether a restraint is
"procompetitive"); see also WARREN FREEDMAN, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND
ANTITRUST 4-12 (1987) (describing antitrust principles in the context of pro-
fessional sports and remarking that those principles aim to protect the spec-
tators' interests).
153. See generally STAUDOHAR, supra note 150, at 64-67 (discussing pro-
fessional football leagues that have challenged the NFL and arguing that po-
tential competitors have little chance of taking away NFL owners' profits or
spectator loyalty).
154. That professional athletes usually negotiate contracts individually
and have salaries that greatly exceed the average American worker demon-
strates their superior bargaining power. See STOUDOHAR, supra note 150, at
12-13 (discussing professional athletes' bargaining power); see also ROBERT C.
BERRY ET AL., LABOR RELATIONS IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 10 (1986) (arguing
that professional sports differ from other industries in that athletes become
folk heroes and demigods while regular employees do not); see supra note 114
and accompanying text (citing the Supreme Court's admission that profes-
sional athletes are different from most workers because of their enhanced
bargaining power).
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minor league players, 55 outside of traditional wages; 56 there-
fore, a fixed-salary provision is not as damaging in professional
football as it might be in a more traditional industry. Perhaps
most importantly, the players in Brown refused to exhaust all
available labor law channels against the owners' actions before
resorting to the antitrust laws.157 The developmental squad
players chose to attack immediately the agreement on anti-
trust grounds, preferring the treble damages of the antitrust
laws 58 to meager labor law sanctions.'59 Consequently, the
155. See supra note 4 (describing the role of the NFL's developmental
players).
156. The greatest benefit offered any developmental player in sports is the
opportunity eventually to play for the team, which means greatly increased
pay and, in most sports, the right to negotiate contracts individually. In re-
ducing each scrimmage squad player's salary, owners actually created more
developmental squad positions, arguably increasing the future opportunities
for more first-year players. See generally BERRY ET AL., supra note 154, at 4
(discussing the extremely small number of players that make the "major
leagues," creating the real economic value of an opportunity to play profes-
sional sports); STAUDOHAR, supra note 150, at 79-80 (discussing the effects of
the 1987 NFL players strike).
157. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (stating that the record in
Brown makes no mention of the players instituting unfair labor practice
charges). The Court may have implicitly considered that, in Brown, the own-
ers first notified the players of the new fixed salary proposal on May 18, 1989.
Brown v. Pro Football, 782 F. Supp. 125, 129 (D.D.C. 1991). On May 30, 1989,
the players' bargaining representative notified the owners that the players
wished to discuss the resolution and would not concede the status quo right to
individual salary negotiation. Id. Without further discussion, the owners'
representative concluded in a letter to the owners, dated June 16, 1989, that,
"for implementation purposes, the [developmental squad] issue is clearly at an
impasse." Id. (citing Plaintiffs' Statement of Material Facts Not in Genuine
Dispute, at 4) (internal citations omitted). These undisputed facts raise seri-
ous doubt about whether the owners bargained in good faith for the develop-
mental squad resolution, making NLRA unfair labor practice charges the
players' most natural channel of recourse.
Another factor that may have influenced the Court in its statement about
the non-applicability of the antitrust laws is the previous resolution of NFL
labor disputes and strikes. In 1982 and 1987, the players led strikes that
proved largely ineffectual in forcing the owners to agree to more generous
terms of employment. STOUDOHAR, supra note 150, at 75-83. In Brown, the
developmental squad players knew that a successful labor law charge against
the owners would only result in more collective bargaining. They had little
bargaining power alone, however, because the "varsity squad" players would
never agree to a strike, given that they stood only to gain lower salaries from
the developmental players' demands. See id. at 74-75 (discussing the balance
of power within professional sports unions and the questionable effectiveness
of such unions in fairly and equally representing all members).
158. See supra note 18 (noting that the antitrust laws provide for treble
damages).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
antitrust interests in Brown were not compelling enough to
outweigh the owners' labor interest in forcing the players back
to the collective bargaining table. Therefore, considering the
factors that created a presumption in favor of applying the
nonstatutory exemption and the lack of a compelling antitrust
interest, the resolution in Brown deserved the protection of the
nonstatutory exemption under the Supreme Court's traditional
balancing test.
The most important reason for interpreting Brown as ap-
plying a balancing test is that a simple checklist approach like
the one lower courts have been using since Mackey is inconsis-
tent with Supreme Court precedent. 160 In Radovich,161 the
Court held that agreements involving only a labor market will
not qualify for the nonstatutory exemption if they blatantly
violate the antitrust laws, because those laws "protect the vic-
tims of the forbidden practices as well as the public." 162 There-
fore, under Radovich, an agreement strictly between an em-
ployer and an employee that involved a mandatory subject of
bargaining1 63 and did not violate labor law or policy could still
be subject to antitrust attack. Under a strict application of a
four-pronged test based on Brown, however, such an agreement
would be exempt automatically from the antitrust laws be-
cause it did not violate labor law or policy, it involved a manda-
tory subject of bargaining, and it concerned only the parties to
the collective bargaining.
This simple checklist approach based on Brown would also
be inconsistent with the interpretation of Supreme Court deci-
159. See BARTosIC & HARTLEY, supra note 30, §§ 7.04, 8.07 and accompa-
nying text (stating that NLRA remedies are usually limited to injunctions and
bargaining orders).
160. The doctrine of stare decisis requires that, for a judicial system to
maintain continuity over time, prior decisions must be followed unless their
"principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more
than a remnant of abandoned doctrine." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 855 (1992).
161. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
162. Id. at 454; see supra note 61 and accompanying text (describing the
Radovich holding and other cases in which the Court has not required a direct
restraint on a product market to subject agreements to antitrust scrutiny).
163. Radovich, 352 U.S. at 448-49. The agreement at issue in the case
took the form of a standard player contract, under which a player could not
sign with another team without employer consent. Id. at 449. Therefore, the
agreement dealt with a condition of employment considered mandatory under
NLRA § 8(d). 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994); see also supra note 32 and accompa-
nying text (discussing courts' interpretation of the term "mandatory subjects
of bargaining").
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sions that first established the nonstatutory exemption. In
Jewel Tea," the agreement among unions to limit operating
hours concerned a mandatory subject of bargaining and did not
violate labor law or policy, but it directly affected a product
market.165  Thus, a court interpreting Brown as a checklist
would not apply the nonstatutory exemption under the facts of
Jewel Tea. In reality, the Supreme Court applied the exemp-
tion to the operating hours restriction.1 66 In Pennington,167 the
agreement to establish higher wages involved only the parties
to the collective bargaining and dealt with mandatory subjects
of bargaining. The parties reached the agreement through
collective bargaining, and they did not violate the labor laws.1 68
Thus, in Pennington, a court applying a strict four-factor test
based on Brown would have extended the nonstatutory ex-
emption. The Supreme Court struck down the agreement,
however, because the antitrust violation outweighed the labor
interests in the case. 69
These three illustrations demonstrate that interpreting
Brown as following a test that does not balance labor with anti-
trust interests conflicts with Supreme Court precedent. Lower
courts should, therefore, interpret Brown as following a balanc-
ing test that considers the facts and special circumstances of
each case as well as the four factors discussed in the opinion.
This balancing test requires that parties invoking the exemp-
tion show how their actions benefit the peaceful resolution of
an industrial dispute to an extent greater than they injure fed-
eral antitrust policy. 70 Indeed, the Court declared in Penning-
ton that agreements involving nonlabor groups qualify for the
exemption only if they promote the national labor policy of en-
couraging peaceful resolution of industrial disputes and do not
164. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
165. See supra note 62-63 and accompanying text (discussing the working
hours restriction and the Supreme Courts acknowledgment that the agree-
ment worked directly on the product market for meat).
166. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text (articulating the hold-
ing and reasoning of Jewel Tea).
167. United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
168. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (describing the agreement
in Pennington).
169. See supra note 46-48 and accompanying text (articulating the holding
of Pennington).
170. See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text (describing the factors
the Court required for extension of the exemption).
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disregard the antitrust laws in the process.171 Courts must,
therefore, evaluate the extent to which a party's actions further
or frustrate antitrust policy every time they apply the non-
statutory antitrust exemption.
In Brown, the Supreme Court applied the nonstatutory ex-
emption without expressly engaging in any antitrust analy-
sis. 172 It is critical that lower courts interpret Brown as pre-
serving the antitrust inquiry, especially in light of recent
commentaries noting that some employers have read Brown as
removing unilateral multiemployer bargaining actions from
antitrust scrutiny altogether.17 3 If all such actions were indeed
exempt, employers would be encouraged to simply negotiate
until impasse without compromising, when they could unilat-
erally implement their own working conditions. Such a read-
ing of Brown would undermine the federal labor policy of re-
solving industrial disputes through collective bargaining.
Courts must interpret Brown as following a balancing test in
deciding whether to extend the "nonstatutory exemption,"174
171. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 664-65; see also Connell Construction Co. v.
Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975)
(discussing the federal labor policy as encouraging collective bargaining and
the association of employees to eliminate competition over wages, but not
permitting parties to unilaterally restrain competition in product markets);
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689 (1965)
(stating that the Court must analyze the subject matter of the provision in
light of the national labor policies before applying the exemption).
172. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's
comments about the application of the antitrust laws to the questions in
Brown). The Court seems concerned about exposing labor issues to nonexpert
antitrust judges and juries, a fear that is grounded on questionable logic.
There is no administrative body comparable to the NLRB responsible for en-
forcing the federal antitrust laws; the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) may
conduct administrative hearings only on claims under the narrow Federal
Trade Commission Act, not the broader Sherman and Clayton Acts. See
SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, at 75-76 (describing the limited ju-
risdiction of the FTC). Because the antitrust laws are federal laws, all federal
courts are charged with enforcing the policies of the antitrust laws and may
properly rule on antitrust questions. See id. at 81 (explaining the Clayton
Act's jurisdiction and venue provisions).
The Court may in fact have been considering the unique circumstances in
Brown that made the players' antitrust interest less than compelling. See su-
pra notes 154-157 and accompanying text (discussing factors unique to pro-
fessional sports that made the players' interest in bringing antitrust charges
less than compelling in Brown).
173. See Weitzman & McKenna, supra note 14, at B4 (stating that employ-
ers and industrial relations experts interpreted Brown as essentially freeing
multiemployer bargaining activities from antitrust scrutiny).
174. In fact, the nonstatutory exemption is not really an exemption at all
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because a checklist approach would conflict with Supreme
Court precedent, frustrate federal antitrust policies, and en-
courage employers to abuse the collective bargaining process.
CONCLUSION
Brown has severely confused lower courts and employers.
The case appears to affirm the lower courts' Mackey approach,
suggesting that all unilateral employer conduct after impasse
is exempt from the antitrust laws. As a result, Brown threat-
ens to tip the collective bargaining scales in favor of employers,
encouraging them to pretend to engage in "negotiation" and
then, upon impasse, to implement the terms of employment
they desire. This Comment proposes that, while Brown recog-
nizes that labor laws no longer aim to protect employees and
force workers to seek weaker labor law remedies before at-
tempting to invoke the more potent antitrust laws, lower courts
must interpret Brown to apply a balancing approach and
thereby extend the nonstatutory exemption only after weighing
conflicting antitrust and labor policies in each case. This
reading maintains consistency with Supreme Court precedent,
respects antitrust policies, and does not give employers incen-
tive to abuse the collective bargaining process.
The Supreme Court laid down factors that weigh heavily against finding anti-
trust violations in collective bargaining circumstances. However, as long as
courts must always consider antitrust policies when ruling on the validity of
an agreement between parties to collective bargaining, they are acting as an-
titrust and labor courts, enforcing the policies behind both bodies of federal
law. Lower courts should dispose of the term "nonstatutory antitrust exemp-
tion" and recognize that the Supreme Coures "nonstatutory exemption" juris-
prudence simply creates a guide for case-by-case accommodation of federal
labor and antitrust principles.
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